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On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony 
 
ABSTRACT 
The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated 
its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are 
insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of 
testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that 
both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our 
background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the 
testifiers’ character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide 
reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of 
propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence 
for the testimonial beliefs we form. 
_____________________________ 
 
 
It is evident that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgement is by 
nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to that side of itself, when there is 
nothing put into the opposite scale. If it was not so, no proposition that is uttered in 
discourse would be believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men 
would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of what is told 
them. (Reid 1764, 197). 
In this quote Thomas Reid starts with the descriptive epistemological claim that 
unless those propositions we accept supply reasons for disbelief, we are inclined to 
accept testimony. Reid presents this ‘natural’ attitude as the epistemologically correct 
Synthese, volume 131, no. 3, June 2002, 353 – 370. 
2 
attitude: we are justified in accepting testimony credulously. He then supports this 
epistemological principle with the argument that if things were otherwise, if we 
needed to justify our acceptance of testimony, then only a small fraction of our 
testimonial beliefs would be justified. Michael Dummett articulates an almost 
identical argument. Dummett starts with the descriptive epistemological claim that in 
ordinary cases of testimony: 
I go through no process of reasoning, however swift, to arrive at the conclusion that 
he has spoken aright: my understanding of his utterance and my acceptance of his 
assertion are one. (Dummett 1993, 419). 
Dummett then raises the question of whether this feature of our receipt of testimony is 
an “epistemological principle” or a “mere psychological phenomenon”; he raises the 
following doubt. 
Maybe it is simply in our nature to accept the … assertions of others without, usually, 
any scrutiny or reflection; but may it not also be that, if we are to possess knowledge 
acquired by [testimony], we must be able to supply as backing an argument 
corresponding to the inference we omitted to draw? (Dummett 1993, 420). 
This question Dummett answers negatively. If the suggestion were adopted — if we 
must be able to supply reasons to justify our acceptance — then, he claims, “we 
should have to confess to knowing pitifully little.”1 Thus, Dummett is not merely 
claiming that we go through no process of reasoning, rather his claim seems to be 
either that we lack reasons for our acceptance of testimony, or that the reasons we 
have for acceptance are not sufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs. Our credulous 
acceptance of testimony, therefore, must be sanctioned by an “epistemological 
principle”, that is, it must be justified. 
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This argument to the conclusion that credulity is justified may be set out somewhat as 
follows. 
(1) We largely lack reasons — in the sense of propositions believed — for 
accepting testimony. 
(2) In those cases where we do have reasons, these reasons are usually 
insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs. 
(3) Therefore, if our practice of accepting testimony without reason were not 
justified, few of our testimonial beliefs would be justified. 
(4) Many of our testimonial beliefs are justified. 
(5) Therefore, we must be justified, other things being equal, in accepting 
testimony without reason, that is, credulously. 
Variations of this argument have been extremely influential. In arguing against 
reductionism — the view that it is our reasons for accepting testimony that justify our 
testimonial beliefs — Coady claims that acceptance without reasons must be justified 
because we just could not individually justify our testimonial beliefs.2 Similarly, 
Hardwig argues epistemic dependence must be justified because we cannot possess 
reasons for the truth of many our testimonial beliefs.3 Both of these arguments start by 
presuming the truth of premise (1). Furthermore, this presumption tends to be made, 
independently of its use in any argument, whenever the conclusion that credulity is 
justified is accepted.4 
 
Contrary to (1) I will claim that we usually have reasons — in the sense of 
propositions believed — for accepting testimony. Let me label this descriptive 
epistemological claim (R), (for reasons). If (R) is true, then (1) is false and any 
argument that employs (1) as a premise is unsound. The particular Reidian argument 
of the last paragraph may also be contended at premise (2). In disagreement with (2), I 
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will claim that our reasons for accepting testimony can provide evidence for the 
testimonial beliefs we form. It follows that our reasons for acceptance could justify 
our testimonial beliefs. Let me label this italicised claim (E), (for evidence). If (E) is 
true, then (2) may be contended.5  
 
The claims (R) and (E) — we usually have reasons for accepting testimony that can 
be evidential — need to be framed by three important clarifications. First, the 
descriptive claim (R) neither states nor implies that acceptance is always inferential. 
Second, claims (R) and (E) involve an important distinction between the notions of 
reasons and evidence. Third, neither (R) nor (E) is a claim about what justifies our 
testimonial beliefs. Let me consider each of these points in turn. 
 
Our acceptance of testimony is frequently immediate and non-inferential. If (R) was 
equivalent to the claim that our acceptance is usually mediated by an inference to the 
truth of what is expressed, then (R) would be false. However, (R) is not equivalent to 
this psychologically implausible claim. The beliefs that constitute our reasons for 
acceptance tend to be background beliefs. To give a background role to our beliefs is 
simply to acknowledge that acceptance rarely involves explicitly articulating a 
justifying argument. Similarly, if Grice’s analysis is accepted, then our understanding 
of implicature is reasoned but it may, nonetheless, be immediate.6 As a way of 
forming belief, testimony is largely immediate. 
 
Second, claim (R) concerns our reasons for belief. Our reasons for belief are those 
propositions we take to be evidence for what we believe. Claim (E) concerns the 
evidence for our beliefs. Evidence for a proposition either entails or makes probable 
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that proposition. To be evidence a proposition, at least, must be true. By contrast, a 
false proposition may be taken to be evidence and a subject’s reasons for belief need 
not determine that what is believed is true or even probably true. This allows for the 
possibility that our reasons for acceptance are such that they do not provide evidence 
for the testimonial beliefs formed through acceptance. That is, the truth of (R) is 
compatible with the falsity of (E). 
 
Third, according to some theories of testimonial justification, it is our reasons for 
accepting testimony that justify our testimonial beliefs. According to other theories, 
we are justified in accepting testimony without reason and it is, paradigmatically, the 
speaker’s reasons that justify our testimonial beliefs.7 Neither (R) nor (E) makes a 
claim about what justifies our beliefs. The former states that we rarely accept 
testimony without reason. The latter states that these reasons can provide evidence for 
the testimonial beliefs we form — our reasons could be justificatory. This is not to 
claim that such evidence justifies our testimonial beliefs; it is not to claim that our 
reasons are justificatory. Thus both (R) and (E) are neutral with respect to competing 
theories of testimonial justification. 
 
On any occasion where we comprehend an utterance — testimony — we are disposed 
to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement in, the proposition expressed. Whether we 
accept the testimony, reject it, or suspend judgement our doxastic response is rarely a 
product of inference. Nonetheless, I hope to make (R) persuasive through showing 
how our doxastic response to testimony is determined by what we believe, 
background or otherwise. I shall start by considering the general beliefs we have 
about the credibility of testimony and use empirical psychology to try and model how 
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our observation of the communicative context allows us to form credibility 
judgements. This shall occupy the next, and longest, section of this paper. In the 
second section I offer a rather rough epistemic evaluation of the classes of reason thus 
presented and thereby argue for (E). 
 
1. Responding to Testimony 
 
1.1. Prior Presumptions 
We distinguish between different types of testimony. Certain types we are disposed to 
accept, whilst others we are disposed to reject. Given the comprehension of testimony, 
we can recognise the testimony to be a certain type and are thereby disposed to accept 
it or otherwise. Thus, an initial characterisation of the reasons explaining our 
responses to testimony requires an account of our typing of testimony. The doxastic 
dispositions thereby explained are essentially synchronic: our beliefs about 
testimonial types are formed prior to our encounter with any given testimony. In the 
next section, I shall consider how our doxastic dispositions are diachronically 
informed by our engagement with the contextual circumstances of testimony. 
 
We receive testimony from many sources and testimony to different topics. We 
distinguish between these sources and topics. We are more likely to believe friends, 
family and lovers than strangers, doctors than apothecaries, and vicars than lawyers. 
We are likely to believe speakers talking about everyday events, giving us directions, 
or telling us the football scores. However, we tend to be sceptical of speakers talking 
about politics, the greatness of their exploits, or the statistics that favour their opinion. 
On some quite specific topics we may be utterly sceptical, or conversely credulous.8 
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Allowing that content may be identified as a particular topic, and named individuals 
as particular sources, six generic types of testimony could be identified.9 These are (1) 
general topic, (2) general source, (3) general source and general topic, (4) particular 
source, (5) particular topic, and (6) particular source and general topic.10  
 
It is our distinguishing between different types of testimony that explains our 
presumptions. According to Burge, “We make use of a presumption of credibility 
when we read books, signs, or newspapers, or talk to strangers on unloaded topics”.11 
We presume credibility, as Burge notes, but not across the board. We presume that 
certain books and newspapers are credible, but not that all books and newspapers are 
credible. On the contrary, most would presume that much of what they read in the 
National Enquirer or The Daily Sport is false. Moreover, if we presume that the 
testimony of strangers on unloaded topics is credible that is because we have the 
general belief that the testimony of strangers on unloaded topics is credible. Thus, our 
background general beliefs — beliefs about what types of testimony tend to be 
credible — explain our presumptions.12 
 
Our standing disposition to accept a given testimony could then be explained as 
follows. We have a long history of dealing with testimony and on this basis we have 
learnt to distinguish testimonies into types some of which we take to be credible, 
some non-credible and others as credible as not. With this background of belief we are 
in a position to form the judgement, of any given testimony, that it belongs to a 
certain type, say type x. We believe that type x testimony is credible; we would assent 
to the statistical generalisation ‘Testimony of type x is probably true’. We then 
directly infer that this testimony is credible. Our disposition to acceptance is thereby 
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explained by our believing the premises of the statistical syllogism: testimony of type 
x is credible, this testimony is of type x, and therefore this testimony is credible. Our 
standing disposition to reject or suspend judgement in a given testimony is equally 
explained by our possessing a general belief about the credibility of these testimonies, 
only in these cases the testimony will be believed non-credible or as credible as not 
respectively. 
 
This is not to claim that audiences explicitly articulate the statistical syllogism when 
accepting, rejecting or suspending judgement in testimony. It is to claim that an 
audience’s recognition of a testimony as a certain type in conjunction with the belief 
that such a type is credible provides an explanation of their doxastic disposition. The 
statistical syllogism thereby represents our reasons for belief, or otherwise, even if it 
is rarely explicitly articulated.13 
 
Let me provide an illustration. Suppose that I suffer certain pains and visit a doctor 
who diagnoses no more than malaise. I may go through no process of inference in 
accepting the doctor’s diagnosis, my understanding and acceptance may be one, but 
this is not to say that I lack reasons for acceptance. I accept because I have the 
background belief that general practitioners are credible on medical matters and the 
surgery setting supports my presumption that I have communicated with a general 
practitioner. Call the doctor’s testimony d, my credibility belief c and my type belief t. 
I accept the doctor’s testimony because I take the conjunction of c and t to be 
evidence for d. 
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Support for this claim is provided by a consideration of subsequent suspension of 
judgement. If we recognise that p was our reason for believing q, then if we come to 
believe not-p, we will, other things being equal, suspend our belief that q. Thus if I 
were to subsequently come to believe either not-c or not-t, then I should cease to 
believe d. That I should do so shows the conjunction of c and t to have originally been 
my reason for acceptance. It is doubtful that I would abandon my credibility belief, 
but I might learn that the doctor was a charlatan and if I were to learn that the doctor 
has fabricated his qualifications, I should suspend my belief that my pains were no 
more than malaise. In seeking a second, authoritative, diagnosis I show my belief that 
the doctor is a qualified general practitioner to have been, at least part of, my reason 
for accepting his testimony. 
 
We find that in the process of communicating, dispositions to accept, reject or 
suspend judgement are engendered. A testimony might fit no type for which we have 
a general belief concerning its credibility yet our perception of its context can dispose 
us to accept it or not, and a testimony that we might be inclined to reject initially can 
become more plausible as the communicative context supplies further information, 
and conversely.14 I shall now consider how to model such contextual reasons. 
 
1.2. Contextual Reasons 
Suppose that you do not presume to trust strangers even on unloaded topics; maybe 
this is wartime and you are in an occupied land. Nonetheless, needing to find a certain 
landmark you approach a passer-by to ask for directions. It seems intuitive, if you 
understand what is said, that the passer-by could communicate her knowledge of the 
whereabouts of this landmark. Despite an absence of background general beliefs 
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about the credibility of this type of testimony, the communicative context, I would 
argue, can supply reasons for acceptance or otherwise. How this could be so requires 
an empirically plausible explanation. 
 
I think that the first thing to note is that we treat certain, but not all, contextual 
particulars as relevant to the credibility of testimony. In the present example that the 
sun was overhead is a fact that does not seem relevant. However, that the passer-by 
seemed well disposed, smiled, repeated her directions and did not seem in a hurry, do 
seem relevant in that attention to them would, in all probability, dispose one towards 
acceptance. Other circumstantial features, attention to which could dispose one 
towards acceptance or otherwise, include: 
1. The speaker seemed suspicious. 
2. The speaker paid careful attention to what was said. 
3. The speaker contradicted himself. 
4. The speaker’s utterances were thoroughly coherent. 
5. The speaker seemed worryingly eager to be believed. 
6. What the speaker said cast him in a bad light. 
Attention to half of these contextual details — namely 1, 3 and 5 — might dispose 
one to reject the accompanying testimony and conversely the other details. This list 
could be obviously extended almost endlessly. On the assumption that this is correct 
and that we do treat such contextual features as relevant to the question of whether or 
not to accept testimony, then why do we treat these features, and not others, as 
relevant? An adequate answer to this question requires an appeal to empirical 
psychology.15 The following answer could be thus supported. 
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As audiences, we have a history of engaging with testimony. A good deal of this 
history has been successful: much of what we know, we know through testimony. For 
any audience, past testimonies could be divided into three classes: accepted testimony, 
rejected testimony, and testimony on which judgement was suspended. Call these 
classes A, R, and S respectively. Given our past success, we will be inclined to accept 
testimony similar to those in class A, reject testimony similar to those in class R, and 
suspend judgement on testimony similar to those in class S. Suppose that a testimony 
falls into class S if it is equally similar to those in A and those in R. The identification 
of relevant contextual details could then be based on recognition of the similarities 
and dissimilarities amongst the testimonies that are members of A, R. For example, 
suppose two rejected testimonies are similar in point of feature φ. Other testimonies in 
R could also be similar in point of φ. Let Φ stand for the set of φ features extracted 
from class R. From set Φ a proto-typical φ can be judged and in this manner, a set of 
proto-typical features can be extracted from classes R and A. Given that this involves 
no more than rudimentary similarity judgements it seems reasonable to suggest that in 
recognising details 1 to 6 as relevant, we recognise such proto-typical features. 16 
 
Consequently our disposition to accept testimony or otherwise because of the 
communicative context could be represented in the following manner. First, the 
relevant circumstantial features of the context are recognised. This may be a matter of 
consideration or it may be immediate. Each of these features will be similar to a 
proto-typical feature extracted from A and R. The testimony will thereby be judged 
similar to those in class A, to those in class R, or to those in both classes. Thus, we 
would be disposed to accept, reject or suspend judgement in the testimony. In the 
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former case, for instance, we could be represented as reasoning, ‘this testimony is 
similar to those previously accepted, and therefore it is credible’. 
 
Certain weaknesses and strengths of this model are transparent. On the positive side 
the model accounts for how our reasons for accepting testimony, or otherwise, can be 
(1) contextual, (2) intuitive and (3) learnt. On the negative side, the model seems too 
oversimplified and, crucially, it seems a hostage to fortune. Let me take the positive 
points first. 
 
(1) Our reasons for accepting testimony, or otherwise, can be contextual because their 
ground can be the identification of certain contextual details as evidence for the 
acceptability of the testimony, or otherwise. (2) This judgement is intuitive because 
the audience need not occurrently remember any of the past occasions of testimony 
where similar contextual features were identified. It is enough that these occasions 
have defined the proto-type by means of which the present identification is effected. 
(3) Our ability to assess the credibility of testimony improves with experience: each 
new success alters the set of relevant features, such as φ, and thereby the proto-typical 
feature associated with each such set.17 
 
On the negative side, this model is too oversimplified. Relations of similarity exist not 
simply amongst the testimonies in A and R but also between the testimonies in these 
classes. Thus, the definition of proto-typical features on the basis of experience seems 
more difficult than suggested. This complication might reasonably be put aside 
insofar as it is not clear that insurmountable processing problems are posed. However 
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to do this may seem cavalier in the light of the second weakness of this model, namely 
that it is a hostage to fortune. 
 
It has been argued on many fronts that empirical psychology requires a richer account 
of similarity. In particular, accounts of similarity must take into consideration the 
subject’s ‘theory’ about those objects taken to be similar.18 Of particular concern to 
the model just outlined is the fact that people seem to be psychological essentialists. 
That is, 
[P]eople act as if their concepts contain essence placeholders that are filled with 
‘theories’ about what the corresponding entities are … [and which] provide or 
embody causal linkages to more superficial properties. (Medin and Ortony 1989, 186). 
Thus it seems that whilst kinds may be represented as prototypical configurations of 
observable features, kinds are identified through the possession of a shared ‘essence’. 
It is because of this ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ that a member of a given kind is taken to 
possess the propensity to manifest the features by which the kind is represented and 
members of the kind are recognised. 
 
Insofar as recent psychology requires a richer notion of similarity that incorporates a 
subject’s theories about those objects that are taken to be similar, then it seems that an 
alternative account of our credibility judgements is needed. To assess a testimony as 
credible is, paradigmatically, to explain the speaker’s utterance in terms of his 
possessing the intention to share his knowledge. Judging the credibility of testimony 
therefore involves some explanation of a speaker’s behaviour. Recent psychology 
suggests that our explanations of behaviour tend to proceed as follows. First, as it is 
an individual’s behaving as he did that is the explanandum, this behaviour is salient 
rather than the situational background.19 Second, the individual’s behaviour is taken to 
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be representative: we take a subject to have acted as he did because of a stable 
disposition to act in this way.20 Third, in revealing these dispositions the subject is 
judged to possess a certain character or nature and the subject’s behaviour is then 
explained in terms of the theory possessed concerning persons with this character. 
Thus it seems that our observation of contextual details allows a judgement of the 
speaker’s character. Whether we take the testimony to be credible will then hinge on 
the theory we possess concerning persons of this nature. For instance, to return to the 
original example, our observation that the passer-by seemed well disposed, smiled, 
repeated her directions and did not seem in a hurry, seem relevant because these 
details seem to allow a judgement of the passer-by’s character. Insofar as these 
observations suggest an honest helpful character, we should be disposed to 
acceptance. 
 
Call the first account of our contextual reasons the situational model; call the second 
account of our contextual reasons the character model. Like the situational model, the 
character model equally shows how our reasons for accepting testimony, or otherwise, 
can be (1) contextual, (2) intuitive and (3) learnt. As with the situational model, our 
reasons can be contextual because their ground can be the identification of certain 
contextual details as evidence for the acceptability of the testimony, or otherwise. A 
judgement of credibility is intuitive because the audience need not occurrently 
remember past encounters with similar characters. These occasions rather supply 
those configurations of character-attributes needed in order to form a theory of this 
character and to determine the prototype by means of which such characters are 
recognised. Moreover, an audience’s ability to assess the credibility of testimony 
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could be learnt as our experience of testimony could ground our knowledge human 
wiles.21 
 
My purpose is to provide an account of our reasons for responding to testimony as we 
do. It is plausible to suppose that, in this regard, our observations and beliefs about the 
testimonial situation and the character of the testifier are both relevant. Thus, I shall 
not attempt to arbitrate between these models, but assume without further ado that 
there is some descriptive truth to both. As classes of reason, situational and character-
based reasons are similar to and differ from our prior reasons in the following 
respects. They are similar in that a given testimony is characterised as a certain type 
and a judgement of credibility is a consequence of this judgement of type. They differ 
in that for situational and character-based reasons testimonial types are broadly 
individuated as credible, non-credible and as credible as not. The given testimony is 
then identified as belonging to a type on the basis of contextual features, either of the 
testimonial situation or the testifier. By contrast in the case of our prior reasons, types 
of testimony may be quite narrowly characterised and a given testimony may 
identified as belonging to a type prior to its encounter. There remains one more 
important class of reason governing our response to testimony. 
 
1.3. Existing Beliefs 
The general beliefs we have about testimonial types, our observation of the 
communicative situation and our observation of the character of the speaker can 
provide our reasons for accepting, rejecting or suspending judgement in testimony. So 
too can our beliefs (1) as to the truth of the proposition expressed and (2) as to the 
cost of our accepting a falsehood. 
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Our disposition to accept testimony or otherwise can depend on our beliefs as to the 
truth of the proposition expressed. If, for instance, we already know what the speaker 
says, then we will be disposed to accept his testimony even though this will not alter 
our knowledge. Conversely, if we believe that what the speaker says is very unlikely, 
then we will be disposed to reject his testimony. To give Hume’s example, given that 
he had no experience of sub-zero temperatures, it required very strong testimony to 
get the Indian Prince to believe that water freezes.22 In general, our beliefs pre-dispose 
us towards accepting, rejecting or suspending judgement in any proposition. We then 
weigh this predisposition to acceptance or otherwise against the testimony we have 
received.23 
 
Our dispositions to accept testimony or otherwise can also depend on our beliefs as to 
the cost of accepting a falsehood. Where the cost to the speaker is high, we should be 
disposed towards acceptance. Within institutional scientific contexts the cost to 
speakers of fabricating results is such that there is a powerful constraint on speakers to 
be trustworthy. Thus we judge that the scientific testimony of scientists, as a type, 
tends to be credible.24 Where the cost to ourselves of accepting a falsehood is high, we 
should be disposed towards rejection or suspension of judgement. 
 
Our disposition to accept, reject or suspend judgement in testimony can be explained 
in terms of our background beliefs. A complete explanation might have to refer to (1) 
our general beliefs about testimonial types; (2) our judgement of the testimonial 
situation; (3) our assessment of the speaker’s character and (4) our beliefs as to the 
truth of the proposition expressed and the cost of our accepting a falsehood. These 
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background beliefs articulate our implicit reasons for believing or disbelieving a 
proposition expressed by intelligible testimony. Our response to testimony is 
rationally sophisticated: when we accept testimony, we usually have reasons for doing 
so. The claim that we usually have reasons for accepting testimony — claim (R) — 
embodies little more than recognition of this rational sophistication. 
 
2. Evaluating Our Reasons for Acceptance 
 
When we accept testimony we usually have reasons for doing so. However, a 
subject’s reasons for belief need not determine that the proposition believed is 
probably true. What we take to be evidence need not in fact be evidence. Thus, to 
evaluate our reasons for acceptance is to determine whether what we take to be 
evidence tends to be so; it is to determine whether our reasons for belief are truth-
conducive. To evaluate our reasons for acceptance each class of reason identified 
above must be considered independently. If the dispositions engendered by a class 
lead, on average, to true belief, then the practice of accepting testimony, or otherwise, 
on the basis of such reasons is truth conducive.  
 
2.1. Prior Presumptions 
Our disposition to accept a given testimony can be partially explained by our 
background reasoning, ‘this testimony is a certain type, testimonies of this type are 
credible therefore this testimony is credible’. Our dispositions to reject or suspend 
judgement in a given testimony may be similarly explained. These statistical 
syllogisms clearly articulate justifying arguments. In the limiting case, the stated 
inference is deductive. The premises of a statistical syllogism provide evidence for the 
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conclusion when true. The major premise in our acceptance, or otherwise, of 
testimony concerns the credibility of a certain type of testimony. The premise ‘type x 
testimony is credible’ is true only if type x testimony is probably true. This raises the 
question of whether or not we are in a position to know such statistical generalisations 
and how we come to form type credibility beliefs. 
 
One possibility is that our type credibility beliefs are in fact beliefs as to the probable 
truth of types of testimony, formed because of our observing the truth of testimony. 
However, if this is the case there is little reason for thinking our type credibility 
beliefs are true because, to quote Coady, “it seems absurd to suggest that, 
individually, we have done anything like the amount of fieldwork … require[d].”25 A 
psychologically more plausible possibility is that type credibility beliefs are based 
upon our successful history of dealing with testimony. After all, our history of 
acceptance has largely been a history of knowledge acquisition. Insofar as we have 
acquired knowledge rather than false belief and our doxastic responses are at least a 
partial consequence of our type credibility beliefs, then this past success should ensure 
that our type credibility beliefs are largely true. This is not because we have 
confirmed through observation that our history of dealing with testimony has been 
successful, but simply because as a matter of fact it has been so. If our type credibility 
beliefs were largely false, then past success would not be what in fact it is. Thus our 
type credibility beliefs must be largely true and if this is the case, then as the major 
premise of a statistical syllogism, these beliefs provide evidence for the truth or falsity 
of testimony.26 
 
Synthese, volume 131, no. 3, June 2002, 353 – 370. 
19 
2.2. Contextual Reasons — the situational model 
Our disposition to accept a given testimony can be partially explained by our 
implicitly judging this testimony similar, in its relevant contextual details, to those 
hitherto accepted. Being relevantly similar to the class of accepted testimony is 
evidence for the truth of a given testimony if and only if two conditions are satisfied. 
First, the class of accepted testimony is largely true. Second, it is not purely accidental 
that the contextual details defining the similarity relation define this relation to a class 
of testimony that is largely true. In like manner, our disposition to reject a given 
testimony can be explained by our implicitly judging it similar to testimonies hitherto 
rejected. And the existence of this similarity relation is evidence for the falsity of the 
testimony if and only if most rejected testimonies have been false and it is not 
accidental that this testimony is similar to this class of mainly false testimony. Our 
disposition to suspend judgement is to be explained in terms of these two cases. 
 
Given the present descriptive, non-sceptical epistemological context I assume that the 
first conditions are satisfied. I assume that we usually acquire knowledge rather than 
false belief through testimony. This implies that that those testimonies we accept are 
true more often than not. I assume that the corollary holds and those testimonies we 
reject are false more often than not. The difficulty lies with the second two conditions. 
I focus on acceptance. 
 
To form a judgement of credibility is simultaneously to explain and evaluate a 
speaker’s testimony. Thus, a judgement of credibility involves an explanation of 
behaviour. Two ways of explaining the behaviour may be distinguished. Dispositional 
explanations treat the enduring dispositions of the subject — his ‘character’ or 
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‘nature’ — as the cause of behaviour. Situational explanations treat the situational 
pressures — where ‘situations’ are characterised at all levels, physical, social and 
personal — as the cause of behaviour. Accurate explanations tend to be situational, 
(see below). This is because most people tend to respond similarly to comparable 
situational pressures. If it is then assumed that the contextual details that underpin our 
acceptance provide an adequate characterisation of the testimonial situation, then it 
does not seem purely accidental that an accepted testimony is probably true. It has 
been assumed that the class of accepted testimony is largely true and it may be 
assumed that in similar situations speakers will manifest similar behaviour. The 
truthfulness of their utterances will be an aspect of this.  
 
2.3. Contextual Reasons — the character model 
Our disposition to accept a given testimony can be partially explained by our implicit 
assessment of the speaker’s character. This judgement in conjunction with the 
‘theory’ we possess concerning persons of such nature determines whether we take 
the testimony to be credible or otherwise. A judgement of character can be evidence 
for the truth of a speaker’s testimony; it is taken to be so by the law courts. However, 
one may presume that a judgement of character is evidence only if such judgements 
form part of behavioural explanations that tend to be accurate. This condition is not 
satisfied. Explanations of behaviour in terms of an assessment of character both 
under-estimate situational factors and over-estimate the stability of an individual’s 
behaviour across situations. This conjunction Ross and Anderson label the 
fundamental attribution error.27 The error is ‘fundamental’ because accurate 
explanations should exhibit the converse bias. 
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2.4. Existing Beliefs 
Our disposition to accept, reject or suspend judgement in a given testimony can be 
partially explained as a consequence of our beliefs as to the truth of the proposition 
expressed and beliefs as to the cost of accepting a falsehood. Our beliefs as to the 
truth of the proposition expressed and the cost to the speaker of our accepting a 
falsehood would be evidence for the truth of a testimony if they were knowledge.28 
Given the assumption that most of our beliefs are not merely true but constitute 
knowledge, I assume that this condition is largely satisfied. Our beliefs as to the cost 
to ourselves of our accepting a falsehood are not evidence for the truth of a testimony; 
rather they determine the level of reasons required for acceptance to be doxastically 
responsible. 
 
A complete explanation of our doxastic responses to intelligible testimony could have 
to refer to (1) our general beliefs about testimonial types; (2) our judgement of the 
testimonial situation; (3) our assessment of the speaker’s character and (4) our other 
relevant beliefs. Insofar as (1), (2) and (4) articulate the reasons for our doxastic 
response to testimony, our reasons for acceptance should provide evidence for the 
truth of the proposition believed and our reasons for rejection should provide evidence 
for the falsity of the proposition disbelieved. We should suspend belief when there is 
equal evidence for and against the proposition expressed. Thus, if our reasons for 
acceptance were only based on (1), (2) and (4), one could unequivocally conclude that 
our reasons for acceptance provide evidence for our testimonial beliefs. However, 
where acceptance is based on (3), our assessment of the speaker’s character, our 
reasons might explain the cause of our belief but should not, ordinarily, provide 
evidence for this belief. As such the strongest conclusion that can be drawn is that our 
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reasons for acceptance can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form. This 
is all that (E) states. I should note again that I remain neutral as to what justifies the 
propositions we come to believe through acceptance. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Credulity, Hume claims, is one of man’s greatest weaknesses. Many would counter 
that our acceptance of testimony is rarely other than credulous. Given this assumption, 
our background beliefs are given a largely negative filtering role: we are disposed to 
accept testimony unless our beliefs provide us with a reason for rejection. This is the 
psychological account of testimony that Audi finds in Reid. 
[Our background beliefs] play a mainly filtering role: they prevent our believing 
testimony that does not ‘pass’, for instance because it seems insincere; but if no such 
difficulty strikes us, we ‘just believe’ (non-inferentially) what is attested. These 
filtering beliefs are like a trap door that shuts only if triggered; its normal position is 
open, but it stays in readiness to block what should not enter. (Audi 1997), 406). 
This psychological account, I have argued, is premised on the false descriptive claim 
that we largely lack reasons — in the sense of propositions believed — for 
acceptance. However, if those propositions we believe — our background beliefs — 
provide the reasons for our responses to testimony, then a different psychological 
account is suggested. This is the account I have presented in this paper. 
 
When we accept testimony, it is usually because we accept other propositions that we 
take to be evidence for the testimony. The contrary assumption that our acceptance of 
testimony is usually credulous is an assumption has dominated the epistemology of 
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testimony and figured prominently in arguments for anti-reductive theories of 
testimonial justification. I hope that this account of the reasons underlying our 
response to testimony at once shows this assumption to be false and undermines its 
plausibility. Credulity is a weakness not a psychological default.29 
 
 
Paul Faulkner 
The Department of Philosophy,  
University College London, 
 
 
                                                 
1 (Dummett 1993, 420). 
2 (Coady 1973) and (Coady 1992), Ch.3. 
3 (Hardwig 1985). 
4 For example, Webb endorses (5) and claims, “In only the rarest instances do we reason at all before 
forming a belief based on what someone has told me.” (Webb 1993, 262). 
5 In addition, premise (3) of the Reidian argument is arguably false. One could assert that whilst we are 
not justified in accepting testimony without reason, it is not our reasons for acceptance that ordinarily 
justify our testimonial beliefs. See (Faulkner 2000). 
6 This analogy is owed to (Adler 1994, 272). 
7 These theories are commonly known as ‘reductionism’ and ‘anti-reductionism’ respectively, after 
(Coady 1973). See (Fricker 1995). 
8 Similarly, Adler notes, “we draw all manner of distinctions among classes of potential informants. 
Car salesman are not as trustworthy (within their role) as librarians; professional journals are more 
reliable than the popular press” (Adler 1994, 270).  
9 It is plausible to identify content as a particular topic because for any proposition that we are disposed 
to accept one can imagine many fractionally different propositions that we should be equally disposed 
to accept. 
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10 I have not included the combinations general source and particular topic and particular source and 
particular topic because I take these to be irrelevant subsets of (5) and (6) respectively. 
11 (Burge 1993, 469). 
12 Similar points are made by (Adler 1994). 
13 Continuing the analogy with understanding implicature, Adler claims, “So long as our beliefs 
relevant to evaluating testimony are no harder to process than other contextual information readily 
exploited in conversation, their use cannot be objected to.” (Adler 1994, 273). 
14 For an example, see (Audi 1997, 407). 
15 “The principle way that cognitive science can contribute to epistemology is to identify basic belief 
forming processes.” (Goldman 1986, 181). 
16 The proto-typicality of an object with respect to a class Tversky defines as a linear combination of 
the measures of the features of that object that are shared with the other members of that class and the 
features that are not shared with the other members of that class. A proto-type maximises proto-
typicality. The state of empirical psychology in 1977 was such that Tversky could claim, “Research has 
demonstrated the importance of prototypicality or representativeness to perceptual learning, inductive 
inference, semantic memory, and the formation of categories.” (Tversky 1977, 347). 
17 An analogy suggests itself. On a Davidsonian theory of meaning, the meaning of a sentence depends 
on the meaning of the words that compose it and the meaning of these words depends on what they 
contribute to the truth conditions (meaning) of all the sentences that contain them. Similarly, the 
credibility of a testimony depends on the circumstantial features that individuate it and the relevance of 
each of these features depends on all the observed credible testimonies that contain them. On this 
analogy judging the credibility of testimony from its circumstances is analogous to understanding a 
sentence. 
18 Thus it seems that even as young children our inductive inferences are influenced more by causal 
notions than brute measures of similarity. See (Carey 1985) and (Gelman and Markman 1986). And 
recent work in cognitive and developmental psychology has employed the idea that theory change is a 
model of cognitive development. See (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). 
19 Our inductive explanations and predictions are guided by the availability heuristic. (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1973). 
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20 In accord with psychological essentialism, our inductive explanations and predictions, further, are 
guided by a representativeness heuristic. (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). This seems a happy alliance. 
“Our conceptual and inferential tendencies jointly conspire, at least roughly, to carve nature at its joints 
and project the features of a kind which are essential to it. This pre-established harmony between the 
causal structure of the world and the conceptual structure and inferential structure of our minds 
produces reliable inductive inference.” (Kornblith 1993, 94). Kornblith offers an evolutionary 
explanation for this harmony.  
21 This character model is close to the presentation of Hume’s theory of testimony found in (Faulkner 
1998). 
22 (Hume 1777, 113). 
23 Owen claims that this balancing of evidence can be represented in terms of the probability calculus. 
(Owen 1987). 
24 At least we should make this judgment if we were scientists. Root suggests that such sanctions do not 
govern communication with laypersons, see (Root 2001, 26). 
25 (Coady 1992, 82). 
26 Of course, this argument cannot be happily employed if one hoped to offer a reductive account of 
testimonial warrant. This is because its conclusion that our type credibility beliefs are largely true 
depends upon the assumption that it is knowledge that has been largely acquired from testimony. But if 
it were supposed that our type credibility beliefs underwrite our testimonial knowledge, then this 
argument should be epistemically circular. However, those who reject (E) should also reject reductive 
accounts of testimonial justification and, therefore, should find this use of the assumption is acceptable. 
For the reductionists the challenge is to either deny Coady’s point, through claiming that our 
observations are sufficient, or show how this epistemic circularity is not debilitating. 
27 (Ross and Anderson 1982). A corollary is the tendency to abandon quickly the use of generalisations 
in explaining behaviour. If an individual’s dispositions are stable, any specific information should be 
diagnostic. Thus our psychological essentialism is a source of error in social judgements, see (Nisbett 
and Ross 1980) and contrast note 20. 
28 Williamson would claim a belief is evidence if and only if it is knowledge. See (Williamson 1997). 
The sufficiency claim is less contentious. 
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29 Particular thanks are owed to Matthew Soteriou, Mike Martin and an anonymous referee. 
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